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The European President
John W. Sap*
Article Draco I-211
The European Council’s personal, elected and mandated presidency is without
a doubt one of the major innovations in the Constitution. It is also its most
fought over and precarious novelty. Until the last stages of the Convention, the
great majority of small Member States’ representatives maintained staunch op-
position against the idea. In the end, however, they all reluctantly dropped re-
sistance in the face of the praesidium’s intransigence, supported by the major
Member States. With its new chairman, the European Council can be consid-
ered the great winner among the Union institutions. Apart from becoming a
full European institution (Article I-18), it is getting structured leadership.
Article I-21 of the Draft European Constitution states that the European Presi-
dent is to be elected by the European Council, by a qualified majority for a
term of two and a half years, and cannot serve more than two terms. The Presi-
dent may not hold a national mandate. In order to understand this new func-
tion, one needs to look into its origin, powers, strengths and weaknesses.
Origin: ABC proposal
The concept of a European President is unusual in that, unlike many other pro-
posals, it was not raised in a separate working group of the European Conven-
tion. The idea probably originated from Convention chairman Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing himself, the man who, as France’s president in the ’70s, put forward
the idea of a European Council (first meeting in Dublin, 1975). This time,
however, Giscard arranged for the concept to be put forward – not as a formal
proposal but as a meeting of minds – by the heads of state/government of some
major EU countries. The ABC proposal was named after José Maria Aznar of
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Spain, Tony Blair of United Kingdom and Jacques Chirac of France. Germany
came in only later. The Franco-German paper presented in January 2003
proved Germany was only then won over to the idea of a full-time President of
the European Council.2
Why was the concept of a European president put forward? Formally, the
proposal was introduced for pragmatic reasons. The rotating presidency had be-
come too weak to run the European Council, whose workload during the past
10 to 15 years has increased enormously. Substantively, it also conveyed the
need, perceived by its proponents, for someone to represent Europe in the eyes
of the world. Mr Blair is reported as saying that a President would give the EU
a sharper identity, providing much-needed leadership and accountability. Ac-
cording to the United Kingdom, the President of the European Council should
attend G-8 meetings and work with the Commission president on issues in-
cluding international financial matters, immigration and antiterrorism.3 If the
Union wanted to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation
and become a stabilizing factor and a model in the new, multi-polar world, to
use the words of the Laeken declaration (December 2001), then there was a
perceived need for a presence, at the highest level of authority, on the interna-
tional scene. He or she would serve for several years, overseeing delivery of the
Union’s strategic agenda and communicating a sense of purpose to Europe’s
citizens.
Apart from those two arguments made in favour of the new office, one must
consider its impact on the present ‘institutional balance’. This concept covers
the set of established relationships a) between the EU institutions and b) be-
tween the institutions and the Member States including their populations. Al-
though the new presidency would fundamentally alter the institutional balance
or even the constitutional structure of the Union, this was not a point in the
debates, mostly because no one could tell what the change would amount to.
To argue their opposition the smaller countries, which for a long time were
supported or even championed by Germany, could only point at its probable
affecting the Commission’s position. This has worked to slim down the formal
presidency’s stature. While the British, French and Spanish got some of what
they wanted – a president of the European Council elected by prime ministers,
indirectly deriving legitimacy from the national parliaments – the Germans and
the smaller countries got their way, too. They got a strong Commission presi-
dent, elected by Members of the EP and answerable to them, replicating the
German ‘federal’ model at EU level.
2 CONV 489/03 of 16 January 2003.
3 Peter Norman, The accidental constitution. The story of the European Convention. Brussels:
EuroComment, 2003, p. 139.
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This compromise led to anxieties about creating two parallel sets of institu-
tions: one predominantly intergovernmental – a European Council headed by a
powerful president – and the other based on the existing community institu-
tions. It was feared that this would upset not only the equilibrium among insti-
tutions but the balance between countries as well.
Mandate and powers
The Benelux countries took the view that the president, if the office was to have
a solid mandate, should be chosen from among the ranks of the heads of state
government. A memorandum introduced by the Benelux countries stated: ‘The
Benelux will in any case never accept a president elected from outside the
Council’.4 Later, at the insistence of Belgium, the smaller countries did accept
the idea that the president should be external, as is now expressed in the proviso
of Article I-21(3) that the incumbent ‘may not hold a national mandate’. In-
deed, a double allegiance of the incumbent to his national political arena and to
the European one would obviously have flown into the face of the intended ef-
ficacy and durability. In return, the protagonists dropped the requirement, fig-
uring in earlier drafts, that the person should be chosen from people having sat
on the European Council. This concession was merely cosmetic, as it was un-
derstood that the person chosen should have the stature derived from having
been a top governing politician and (consequently) a member of the European
Council. There is, of course, a risk that the office will become one of those
places providing ‘jobs for the boys’, but this is inevitable.
As a result of these and similar anxieties, the office’s duties have been re-
stricted to chairing, stimulating and promoting. There are few, if any, executive
powers that allow him to take binding actions. Where there are such powers,
there is a risk that differences will result in clashes between a full-time president
and ‘his’ European Minister of Foreign Affairs. That is why Article I-21(2)
states:
‘The President of the European Council shall at his or her level and in that capac-
ity ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its
common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’.
To conclude, the European Council president has been granted little formal
powers and will, consequently, have to carve out a real role for him or herself in
practice. The office lacks the advantages and legitimacy of the current rotating
presidency, yet offers countries an opportunity to familiarize themselves with
4 CONV 457/02 of 11 December 2002.
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the European machinery, including its administrative and political aspects.
Holding the presidential reigns in its hands can help a country boost its domes-
tic support for Europe. And the present formula certainly offers opportunities,
particularly to the smaller Member States (giving expression to the equality of
states).
One important question raised by the new formula is: to whom should the
President be accountable or justify his or her actions? An objection frequently
voiced is that the office is undemocratic or has no legitimate basis. This is not
certain. A European President elected by democratically based heads of state
can contribute to European democracy as there is no democracy without politi-
cal leadership. The divisions within Europe that were laid bare by the invasion
of Iraq showed that there is a clear need for an office such as this. And in recent
years, the Commission’s authority has crumbled as a result of fraud and a lack
of decisiveness. From a democratic point of view, a European President may be
preferable to a strong Commission president. In present circumstances or, in
the present political state of Europe, the new president would probably wield
greater authority. It must also be recognized that, in the new Europe, popula-
tion size and power will become more relevant factors. Accordingly, the larger
countries rightly claim a greater say. From a democratic point of view, this is
not illogical. Ultimately, the president should simply be elected by the greatest
number of European citizens. In US constitutional history, direct election of
the president quickly evolved out of the indirect formalities (which are still in
place). In Europe, this is probably a very long shot.
Promises and risks
As argued above, the first holder of the new office will have little natural, legal
or traditional authority from which to work. His or her election will be a matter
of agonizing compromise. He or she will have to start from scratch and earn
their way into authority. This may provide, however, some better clues to the
risks and the promises of the new office than a legal power count would do.
Two contradictory fears have been voiced by opponents. The first is that the
new president will be the mere caretaker of the major Member States. The
other is that the president may be incapable of keeping abreast of divisions be-
tween the Council Members in matters which are essentially the president’s
business – foreign affairs and diplomacy – and may be drawn into meddling in
economic government, which is not his business.
It is not known now if the office will prove a success. The risks are serious,
but there is no evolution without risks. What is reassuring, to some extent, is
that the risks are shared among the European Council members, i.e., the Mem-
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ber States. They can hardly afford to make the office a failure; that would turn
the constitutional edifice into a sham in the face of the whole world. Working
on this little capital, the president will have to find agreement, first, between the
major European Member States, without which no concerted EU action in for-
eign affairs is conceivable. Then, he or she will have to find support for this
agreement from the other members. It is good to know that there is enough va-
riety of interest, cultures and allegiances between the three major states, that
once an agreement is found between them, there is bound to be something in it
for most others.
At this point in time, we see only glimmers of the new office, weakly shining
from the yawning risks of failure. We tend to forget that it was thus with the
American presidency at the time of its creation.
Questions
1. Will the President of the European Council undermine the role of the
President of the Commission or the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs or re-
inforce these?
2. What is the governmental structure of the EU in which the President of the
European Council may ultimately be conceived?
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